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Epilogue: Civil War and Human Divisiveness 
Human divisiveness, the tendency for human beings to organise themselves into diverse and 
smaller communities, has always been a trait of mankind. Neither universal empires – such as 
Rome, which provided diverse peoples with citizenship rights – nor universal religions 
devoted to only one God – such as Islam – could suppress it. Nor have they been able to 
prevent its expression during civil war. More than religious schism, or the formation of new 
language groups, civil war is now the most troubling manifestation of this tendency. The 
problem it poses for those who believe in the essential unity of humanity has actually become 
stronger as the world becomes more globalised. Ethnic groups continue to argue for 
recognition on the grounds that they will contribute to the cultural stock of humanity, and 
universal norms like democracy, progress, or human rights, continue to justify rival positions 
in civil war. The altruistic expectation that more development will eventually produce less of 
this divisiveness is a forlorn hope. Hence it is appropriate that an epilogue to this book should 
ask what the literature on civil war tells us about this trait in humankind. 
 
Two perspectives on human divisiveness 
This  literature  could be said to consist in a set of theories that aim to explain the form of 
human divisiveness represented by the recent waves of civil war. It focuses on the period 
since 1945, and its historical remit is the new states created by decolonisation. The sceptic 
will object that civil wars have occurred in all periods of recorded history – for all kinds of 
reasons – and that a proper consideration of this form of human divisiveness requires a 
longer-term perspective.  Yet a discussion of the post-1945 context can shed light on the basic 
analytical question in this field. In the nineteenth century ‘naturalists’ saw war as a natural 
expression of the dark side of human nature: that inherent cultural and biological differences 
continually drive people into war. ‘Situationalists’, on the other hand, believed war an 
exceptional event, which flourished only in certain contexts.  
 
The situationalist perspective on human conflict is largely correct in that it    helps us explain 
more.  Violent  conflicts are  usually the  product of exceptional contexts. A constant – such 
as human nature – cannot explain how these contexts arise. Consider the current divisions 
between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Syria. Some perennial sources of human divisiveness: 
clannism, sectarianism, or religious resurgence, are relevant. Yet why have they come to 
matter now? The divisions have resulted from the unusual way in which a Shia minority group 
from the margins –the Alawites from the hills above Latakia – gained control of the secular 
and totalitarian Ba’ath party, and went on to suppress the majority of the Syrian population 
for decades. This system was the concrete product of the special military training and 
entitlements of this Shia minority group under French colonial rule (1920–45). Hence there is 
a very  specific situational  factor to this civil war (Ruthven 2013). 
 
Other aspects of civil war are more   open to   the naturalist perspective.   Unlike     changes 
in voting behaviour, the spread of civil society, or population growth,  civil wars  are  not 
produced developmentally: they are often the result of dramatic and unexpected  crises, like 
mental breakdowns. Hence, in    addition to    specifying the precise contexts from  which they 
emerge,  it is    important to look at the experience they bring, and what these experiences 
disclose about   human nature.   Hence we  can   distinguish between    two approaches: that 
of  tracing the historical factors that make for conflicts, and  studying what people experience  
when these wars  begin (Kalyvas 2006: 3-5, 52-87). This distinction  takes us back to 
Thucydides, for whom the initial causes of stasis were less important than what set in during  
its course (Price 2011: 32). He stressed how typical sources of solidarity in peacetime, like the 
family, can lead to bitter divisions during civil war. His was a vivid summary of the  changes in 
behaviour  brought about by internal war: 
Then, with the ordinary conventions of civilised life thrown into confusion, human nature, 
always ready to offend even where laws exist, showed itself proudly in its true colours, as 
something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate to the idea of justice, the enemy to 
anything superior to itself; for, if it had not been for the pernicious power of envy, men would 
not have so exalted vengeance over innocence and profit above justice. Indeed, it is true that 
in these acts of revenge on others men  may take it upon themselves to begin the process of 
repealing those laws of humanity which are there to give a hope of salvation to all who are in 
distress, instead of leaving those laws in existence, remembering that there may come a time 
when they, too, will be in danger and will need their protection (Thucydides, trans. Rex Warner 
1972: 245). 
 
The fact  that Thucydides’   insights  remain relevant shows   that the problem of   human 
divisiveness posed by civil war is not merely a  contemporary one.  In his discussion of the 
murder of the tryrant Hipparchus by Harmodious and Aristogiton, Thucydides    traces  their  
political motives back    to those of homosexual jealousy (Thucydides trans. R. Warner 1972: 
46, 443, 446). Since the   murderers later   became recruited into  the myth of Greek 
democracy, as heroes,  Koselleck (2002: 67) calls Thucydides’  method  one of ‘unmasking’,  a 
strategy very suited   to the task  of illuminating  what civil wars tell us about human 
divisiveness. We  find the same method, underpinned by   similar  strategies   of radical 
disillusionment, in Hobbes,  Goya, and    even  in Kalyvas’ (2006) work on local violence during 
the  Greek civil war of the 1940s. 
 This method  of radical disillusionment is closely connected to the popular  belief that such 
conflicts bring  out      something  dark in   human nature. This  suggestion is   present 
throughout  ‘Los Disastres de la Guerra’, the  series of Goya  sketches about  Spain’s   guerrilla    
war against Napoleon’s army and its aftermath.   On    this  book’s cover the plate  ‘Esto es 
Peor’   shows an enormous half   human body on top of a tree. The   torso suggests   that 
violent  conflict could  so stretch a person’s humanity as to  turn  a man  into  something other 
than human.  Another sketch   ‘Con Razon ó sin ella’ (with reason or not),      shows two men 
being baynotted or   shot by three regular soldiers. The title, which is  deliberately   
ambiguous,     could mean that  the     soldiers alone or their victims had reason to fight and    
die. It might also mean  that    standards of     human   rationality simply   do  not apply.  The 
diabolical expressions on peoples’ faces  - the prevalence of masks, ghosts and witches in the 
prints -      suggest  an alternative reality in which  there is no distinction to be made   between 
good and evil, liberty and fear, or  reality and  hallucination.  
 
Goya  was sketching ‘an inverted world’.    Many have   posed  the question of how he      was 
able to look forward into our   own world from the vantage-point of early nineteenth centry 
Spain. Indeed with  reports from Northern Syria of  forced conversions on pain of torture, 
beheadings, rapes, and massacres of minorities,    ISIS seems to have brought back to   our 
television screens that   part of  human nature     which Goya dramatized.   In     Thucydides 
human nature was both residual and  primordial: once violence begins, more divisive 
behaviour emerges naturally because  people are predisposed to   behave like this.  Hobbes’  
method   was both empirical and theoretical. Although his vision of civil war was certainly 
based on observations  of the brutal  1640s, theoretically,  his end product, the State, was  
already implied in the  premise of civil conflict. This is because  people  were described as 
being subject to a sovereign  authority to begin  with. Only when  that subjection  loosened 
did  the  two elements in his view of human  nature - appetitus et fuge (desire and fear) - give 
rise to civil war (Koselleck 1988:  24, 31). The French     Enlightenment philosopher Denis 
Diderot differed in combining  a    benign view of human nature with a  vision of   man at   
perpetual civil war with   himself. There    was  first a  ‘natural’ man but when       an ‘artificial’    
man was   admitted inside that man  a civil  war  followed which has yet to end. The  natural 
or the  artificial man could prevail: in both cases the result will be human beings ‘divided, 
tugged, tormented, stretched on the wheel’ (Porter 2014: 104).    
 
So it  is clear that  not even  the most pessimistic authors   agree on what human nature 
means.  Yet without   clarity  on   this issue,   establishing  what civil war discloses about human   
divisiveness will be very  difficult.   When we turn to  the  empirical study of  civil war   Carl 
Schmitt praised  Hobbe’s  strategy of disillusionment: for  Hobbes had shown that   during 
such wars    ‘all legitimate and   normative  illusions with which men like to deceive themselves 
regarding political realities   in periods of untroubled security vanish  (Schmitt trans. Schwab 
1996: 52).  Schmitt also predicted that   the fundamental  correctness of Hobbes’ ‘protection 
obedience axiom’ will be  revealed when there arises, within a state, a situation where there 
are organised parties capable of according their members more protection than the state 
(ibid).  For many Yugoslavia in the 1990s has  confirmed this axiom.  Hobbes’      stress on the 
way   people seek out their own kind  primarily for protection and security   was key. Only 
when the  state loosened –a very   Hobbesian fear -  did the divisive behaviour come to the 
fore. 
 
Nonetheless,    the  empirical study  of    such conflicts brings  us no    closer to specifying  what 
exactly   civil war    discloses about human nature.   One reason is that   the   divisive traits in 
human beings  have no one source.   In Yugoslavia, on top of fear    there   was   also greed, 
lust, and the hunger for power among people at the top.   Indeed precisely   because  
conceptions of human nature are  hard to  make specific in explanatory accounts,   art and   
literature may be a  better source of   insights into  the divisiveness of   civil war. In Le 
Testament Français, the novelist Andreï Makine (1997: 57–63) describes the trip of Charlotte, 
a Russian-speaking Red Cross nurse, from France, to the Volga region  where hundreds of  
thousands   had died from famine, and on to Siberia at the height of the civil war in 1921. As 
Charlotte  set off  ‘she saw everything’,   including images of what hell must be like (1997: 58). 
One image was of a horse running wildly through the fields, with a sabre standing erect upon 
its back. The two halves of the rider’s body had fallen to each side, onto the trampled grass. 
This sabre must have cut the rider in two, from shoulders to stomach, before becoming 
embedded in the saddle. Another image was of a group of peasants angrily pushing away a 
barge with long poles to prevent them   landing. Those on the barge had typhus, and were 
dying of hunger. Once they lost their physical strength, they would eventually be unable to 
dock anywhere: awaiting them was just  the ‘indifferent horizon’ of the Caspian Sea. Only 
once, in the Ural mountains, did Charlotte  see a group of people who seemed content during 
the civil war, sitting serenely on a bank scattered with dead leaves, outside a  village which  
had been  half  destroyed by fire. As their pale faces shone with ‘a blissful calm’ in the mild 
autumn sun, the realisation soon dawned on her that these were lunatics, just freed from a 
mental asylum that had just burnt down. 
 
 Charlottte was   also experiencing       an  inverted world, an idea    that    has   its psychological 
and  sociological equivalent in  the    concept of fragmentation.  The concept was  implicit in 
the  earlier discussion of  the consequences of decolonisation.  As   the    political  map  of  the      
world   fragmented into    more and  more nation states during and  after World War Two, the 
next step was often    the fragmentation of the  new states    themselves into civil war. When   
a   specific  conflict begins,  we     can  also  think of   how it  may deteriorate. Based   on    
observations of Angola, Chad, the Congo, India, Liberia, Peru and Yugoslavia in the 1990s,  
anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson suggests  that a    conflict may   transform    itself   from  one  
where the future   existence of the state (although challenged) is  not in doubt, to  a  situation 
where  the   state fragments into smaller states, to the final crisis   where the  sovereignty of  
any  national government is  in doubt (Ferguson 2003: 3).  
 
Since   fragmentation  can  be  taken as a sociological   synonym for human  divisiveness, and 
not just one of its consequences, the      next section will  try to  explain why it    aquires such 
force  during civil wars.  Consider     the statement made by  the    British Prime Minister David 
Cameron at the NATO summit in September 2014. On the  problem of Islamic extremism 
Cameron  argued that only after the ‘fracturing’ of states through civil war did this extremism 
‘bubble to the surface’ (Cameron, 5 September 2014). In  order to understand  how   the 
divisive traits in human beings – of which Islamic extremism is  one form – ‘bubble to the 
surface’,    we need to  understand the experience a society  goes through  when  it becomes 
‘fractured’, where this fracturing  comes from, and what the    fractures which result from  
this   experience are based on. Since    there   is an   analogy between   this   experiential 
approach to conflict    and the way an  individual    personality can fragment  under stress, the  
emphasis  will be on how different sources of fragmentation can combine to devastating  
effect. 
 
Human Divisiveness as Fragmentation  
Fragmentation, and omens of fragmentation, have   always been part  of the experience of 
civil war. In Thucydides,   it was fragmentation – not the acts of  violence themselves – that 
threatened the unity of a polis whose primary purpose was the promotion of citizenship and 
education (Pouncey 1989: 149).  The purpose of Hobbes’ Leviathan was to prevent the 
fragmentation of Britain and Ireland into anarchy. The near-collapse of the Assad regime in 
Syria over the past three years  has produced just exactly this situation. Since March 2011 no 
less than 6.5 million Syrians – 50 per cent of the population – have been forced to leave their 
homes. Some put the figure much higher.  In the twelve months before August 2014, one 
million of these had fled abroad: mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. By August 2014 
the     number of those killed in the civil war was just under 200,000 (Zaman, 20 August 2014). 
If the concept of fragmentation illuminates anything about civil war, the extent and rapidity 
of such a collapse must be explained. 
 
The first question is   where fragmentation comes from.  For Hobbes fragmentation was a   
top-down process. Had the public not perceived a division of powers emerging between the 
Crown and parliament, the division of England into rival armies, and the superimposition of 
religious differences onto political ones, would not have happened (1985: 236). Fearful, 
competitive and selfish human nature came into play only when central authority weakened.  
Hobbes’ fear of unbridled political competition led him to juxtapose ‘civil society’ with the 
nightmarish ‘state of nature’. His concepts for conflict (‘contumely’, ‘civil warre’, ‘tumult’, 
‘rebellion’, ‘sedition’) can all be used by those ‘above’ to denounce challenges to their rule 
coming from ‘below’.  
 
In contrast to Hobbes’ stress on state collapse as the source, the discipline of  sociology can 
help  us see fragmentation    coming from below. Hobbes’ top-down approach does not help 
us   trace the way in which the disintegration of a state proceeds through that intricate, but 
always potentially destructive, latticework of personal relationships, kinships, local and 
regional loyalties, and ideological beliefs that structures any society (Regan 1999: 6). The   
fragments that result are neither   random nor natural: they reflect pre-existing  social 
relations. Consider Afghanistan, scene of  continuous destruction and   warfare since the  
1980s. The consequences include over 1.5 million war-related deaths, many more wounded 
and   traumatised, and the flight abroad of over a quarter of the population. One source of 
friction that has been exacerbated by the experience of Taliban rule   is the divide between 
the Pashtuns and everyone else. Yet many Pashtuns hate the Taliban too, and the rivalry 
between two ancient Pashtun tribes, the Durrani and the Ghilazi,     is another complicating 
factor.  When one considers that the other ethnic groups reject the Taliban, and that the 
cleavages also   reflect rivalries between cities (such as the Taliban stronghold Kandahar and 
Kabul) we can see just   how many divisions have been re-ignited by the US-led invasion in 
2001.  Their cumulative effect has been to fragment the society from the very top  down to   
each  valley and village. 
 
The next question is why    the process of fragmentation is sometimes unstoppable, and why 
fragmentation  can destroy not just states, but societies, so quickly. The ancient historian and 
classicist Peter Pouncey (1980:  145) notes that in  Thucydides stasis   took on a whirpool 
character:  as people were sucked in  to the conflict   and sought only to  save themselves,  
this only   fragmented  the  polis further.  This spiral of descent    can  happen  where    the 
state  is  artificial in the sense    that it is not  grounded in strong social relations.    For instance, 
since  the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya  has become ‘a land of regional, tribal, ethnic 
warlords’    (Cockburn 2014). The prospect that another strongman will be needed to put an 
end to    the assassinations, fragmentation, and racketeering is certainly Hobbesian.  Oil 
revenues are a fraction of what they were, people are vulnerable to  the   arbitrary rule of 
rival militias, and    no one has the authority to disarm them. The current divisions are not 
ideological: because of the absence of a cohesive Libyan identity, sectarian, ethnic, and 
regional divisions seem more important (Cockburn 2014).  
 
Fragmentation may  also become   unstoppable when  it  has   many sources. The Greek 
conception of stasis was of a state of discord between different parts  which produced so 
much division as  to  disrupt the healthy functioning of the whole. The medical term 
metastasis, which means the movement of a disease from one part of the body to another, 
has stasis as its root.  The connection between the two concepts   implies that the  affliction 
of civil war is at its worst when all parts of  the body politic  become  afflicted by internal 
divisions of different   kinds.     In Syria: The Death of a Country, The Economist (23 February 
2013)   depicted a land increasingly prey to feuding warlords, Islamists and gangs – 'a new 
Somalia rotting in the heart of the Levant’ (ibid: 13). The    process of   disintegration began 
with  the   emergence of cracks in  the    political system, and  may end  up   destroying  the    
social and geographical basis of the Syrian state.   An early aspect of this was territorial: the   
regime was determined to consolidate its grip along a north–south axis from Damascus 
through Homs and Hama to Latakia, the port and region that were home to the Assad family 
and its Alawite sect.    As more Alawites were recruited into the army, the Syrian conflict 
became increasingly sectarian. What has emerged is a hardened and increasingly  sectarian 
underclass on each side: disenfranchised, mainly Sunni rebels, and the regime’s mainly poor 
Alawites, have come to bear the brunt of the fighting.  In other words the  Syrian body politic   
is being afflicted by fractures of many kinds. 
 
The final question concerns   the nature of the    fragments that are   produced by civil war.  A 
sociological  approach should     be able to show that these are not simply a product of the 
randomness of civil war.     In   Syria,    three  possible outcomes   are;   a partitioned    national 
homeland, a  divided   and resentful population within an authoritarian  state, or    a  situation  
of  indefinite  de facto multiple  sovereignty. A re-structuring of       the Syrian      state        may 
produce         fragments   which     appear as  the   remnants of   a formerly  unified    society. 
Yet   if   separate      political  entities are not formed,      the    concept  of  fragmentation      
may just    refer    to  the polarised   social  relationships    within a divided Syria, with    the  
fragments  which    result from  the war   remaining  interrelated,  if    disconnected, parts of   
Syrian   society as a  whole. Either way the    lines  of division - Cameron’s  ‘fractures’ -   will   
reflect    pre-existing social relations.    
 
If   we     want   to      explain    the    enduring   associations  of  civil war   with  chaos and   
disaster -especially   why  the     tendencies  towards  human    divisiveness gain  such    
momentum during civil wars -   tracing   the   sources of   fragmentation in   this  way is  one 
approach. The advantage of  this understanding of conflict  is that, as with any   illness, once     
you understand  it, you are less likely to be    affected by it. The  same  cannot be  said of the  
tendency to  blame everything on human nature: as if the sources of extreme  human 
divisiveness need no specific  explanation.  Moreover, as       with  an  individual  whose mind   
has   disintegrated,    finding   social and  political explanations  for these events    may   help 
us to see them as  being other than random. In terms of their sociology   Afghanistan and Libya  
show that      religious, tribal, and regional    divisions   can be easily exploited to   break up a 
state;  they are not, however, so malleable that  they can  be manipulated from above to  
reconstruct a more cohesive state.   
 
Perhaps the  central lesson  is that  these tragedies  are usually      the   result  of    many   
processes combining;  as with a  nervous breakdown,  the sources of   fragmentation  are 
plural, not  singular.  For example,  observers  were  quick to see in  the   rapidity of Syria’s  
collapse over the past three years    the     fragility of the whole regional  system   of states 
constructed by  the British and the French at the   end of World War I. Initially, Syria  was a 
state simply hacked away from the  carcass of the Ottoman Empire, and jammed between 
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq  and  Israel.  That  the whole regional state system around these 
states is   fragmenting  is  a good example of how   a process which  seems unstoppable on 
the  ground, and seems to come ‘from below’  (in the form of ethnic, territorial and religious 
disputes), may actually have  its   origin   in a structural change at   higher levels of  world 
politics. The Yugoslav    wars   also   occurred at a time, immediately  after 1989, when a    
structural  transformation in  the inter-state system was    taking place. Without  the collapse 
of   communism after 1989, it is unlikely that these wars would      have happened, or that the 
West would have been free to  encourage the break-up of the Yugoslav state.  
 
A similar   combination of    factors from ‘above’ and ‘below’ gives  ethnic conflict its general  
potential to   fragment  states. On the one hand,  the political    salience of ethnic identity 
reflects  structural changes in the international system (‘from above’)   which date back to the 
French revolution in 1789 and which  gave rise to the  nation state as the  default political 
form. To these we can add that  a     taboo against secession no longer exists, as demonstrated 
by Catalonia, East Timor, Eritrea, the Crimea, Scotland, and most recently South Sudan, where  
the south Sudanese diaspora managed to persuade the US administration to support 
independence. Hence there are fewer barriers to state formation than ever before.  On the 
other hand, ethnic and secessionist conflicts come from below in the sense  that they  feed 
off material     grievances and attachments to specific territories on the ground.  When he 
compares the effects of      secessionist ethnic nationalism  to  Russian   matrioshka dolls, the 
political scientist John Coakley (2012: 191), gives us  a good image of the potential for 
fragmentation that this combination of  ‘above and below’ brings. He asks us to visualise a 
doll representing the United Kingdom. We may open it to find it contains a smaller doll, called 
Ireland. Opening the Irish doll, we find another smaller doll Ulster, and opening the Ulster doll 
we find the Northern nationalist Catholic community.  
 
Much of the recent literature suggests that more economic development, more democracy, 
or more equality will move societies away from the dangers of fragmentation. The 2003 World 
Bank report went so far as to suggest that the whole world may become bifurcated between 
poor and marginalised economies stuck in a conflict trap and those out of the danger zone. 
One can only make  the   observation that when people feel beyond civil conflict, they have 
ceased to learn from experience in the sense that one generation actually learns from 
another. The tendency to suppress the   possibility of civil war, to remove self-doubt from 
conceptions of present political orders, will ultimately diminish the very qualities of political 
conviction and leadership that peace actually depends on. One could make a comparison 
between the dangers of fragmentation during civil war   with   the fragility  of the  institution 
of marriage. Every marriage is a law unto itself, and many break down for reasons outsiders 
find incomprehensible. The analogy with civil war lies in the fact that    if   each marriage 
carries within it the seeds of destruction, a failure to recognise or admit this fact will only 
increase the risk of a break-up (Madden 2013: 163). 
 
If fragmentation is   what people   experience during the fighting,  how can a person,  
community, or  society restore  its  lost wholeness afterwards? The late anthropologist Helio 
Belik  (2003: 252-255) noted  that all the parties in the 1992 election in Angola  made much 
of the question of national identity and the search for a common culture.  The attention paid 
to Angolidade (literally, ‘Angolan-ness’), plus the belief in some quarters that those who had 
lived through the war against the Portuguese and the subsequent civil war had proven their 
national identity beyond doubt, led him to wonder    whether  this shared suffering  would  
strengthen a  common  national   identity. In Spain, where   non-elite  accounts of the civil  war 
now challenge those of  the state, the ghosts   of    the past return only as fragments, as during 
the digging up of the graves of those killed by    the Francoist  regime after its formal conclusion 
(NÍ Bhéachain  2010). Those who ‘recover historical memory’  by digging for these  remains 
can never reover the whole of the past. They   can  be compared to archaeologists, who work 
like detectives, looking not for corpses and murders, but for skeletons, shards of pottery and 
fragments of tools. They  may never succeed in establishing the whole truth about a conflict, 
but may patiently piece together the fragments, and close the circle of missing history by 
coming to a fuller interpretation of the past. Yet each  step  may also  be dangerous because 
the discovery of just one more fragment can undermine the whole explanation (Braudel trans. 
S. Reynolds 2001: 27). 
  The      theme of fragmentation  was    present in     Thucydides’    account of the changes in 
language that ‘stasis’  brought  to     Corcyra and, as we saw in chapter  two,      the   traditional 
fear of   civil war – from ancient Rome to  seventeenth century   England -  was of      a form 
of conflict that would turn things upside down. Another    persistent fear  has been that of  
boundaries (between social classes, between  crime and politics, or between private and 
public conflict) collapsing. Andrei Makine’s  image of only       the   mad   being at  ease during 
the Russian civil war   suggests   something similar. Since  the  boundary that  collapses in 
Makine  (and also Goya) is     that   between  reality and delusion,   the    analogy between civil 
war and the emotional and psychological   fragmentation      that appear  as  symptoms of 
schizophrenia is important.  Freud once   said   that to   know the mind we must observe its 
collapse:  that is  what we have been doing with   respect to civil war. The logic of such an 
enquiry   was articulated well by Brian Masters, a biographer of the  mass murderer Dennis 
Nilsen, who said that through considering  the personalities of those that have disintegrated, 
we can better understand those who didn’t (BBC Radio 4: 14 June 2014). Were there no effort 
to explain them, they would remain random, and hence appear more frightening.  
 
The question of definition  
There is a basic  definitional  problem in the study of civil war. Much of the political science  
literature    assumes civil war to be a general phenomenon, and classifies  diverse cases as 
ostensibly similar in order to have enough examples from which to generalise. When violent 
ethnic conflicts, peasant insurgencies, revolutions, and terrorist campaigns, are   all 
considered civil wars, the result is ‘semantic bleaching’: the universal and indiscriminate use 
of a concept such that it loses all meaning (Richter 1995: 56). It is generally agreed that there 
is no empirical criterion specifiying a level of violence that allows us to distinguish civil war 
from other types of internal conflict (Sambanis 2004: 815).    Nonetheless, those   of us who   
believe that we are not seeing a lot of one form of conflict (called ‘civil war’),  and hold   that 
civil war is in fact    a very distinctive type of conflict,   still    face the challenge of  defining   
what makes it distinctive.  
 
The  definitions used  in quantitative studies are suitable for the task of estimating   how much 
conflict and violence there is in this world and of  showing – through  correlations – how  one 
aspect of social reality (such as ethnic diversity) is related to another (violent politics). Few 
believe however that they can illuminate what is actually going on in the social world (Rogers 
2000: 386).   A very  specific problem was raised in chapter two  vis a  vis   Fearon and Laitin’s 
(2003: 75) statement that    of the 127 civil wars  they covered, three  quarters were  actually 
insurgencies. We  do  need   a   definition which can link different cases.  Yet we also need a 
criterion  which   will enable us to distinguish between conflicts which escalate to the point 
where they imperil the basis of the political community, and   those that are simply armed 
conflicts within a state, such as most insurgencies. This is important since we cannot  
meaningfully talk about causes and consequences unless we recognise that most internal wars  
strengthen the state in some way. Civil wars, in contrast, always bring with them  dangers of 
fragmentation. Why   else have the  events which accompanied the deposing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s  President Morsi in Egypt in the summer of 2013 not been considered a civil 
war? The empirical criterion of at least 1,000 deaths was easily exceeded. In contrast, few 
doubt that the almost  200,000 deaths, and the  six to nine million   people displaced from 
their homes in Syria, formed part of a civil war.  
 
The  difference  suggests that we do possess an intuitive conception of the typical social 
experience  that would make a conflict a civil war. Moreover, this  experiential perspective can 
help us identify what it is about civil war that is so destructive. In Syria, the   clearest expression 
of human divisiveness was the division of the  state into two armed blocs. Yet what has made 
for a total conflict of   the kind Thucydides described above, has been the fragmentation of 
these blocs, potentially into many entities. It is  this reality, and  indeed the apprehension of 
this reality, which   makes Syria’s a   qualitatively different and more destructive  conflict  than   
Egypt’s. There  was never  a mortal threat to the future existence of the Egyptian state, and 
the violence has actually allowed the prior state apparatus and the military to assert their 
authority. Part of the problem is that civil wars continue to be viewed in much of the literature  
through the prism of violence. Yet it is not violence alone or its intensity that makes one 
conflict a civil war, and another a mere insurgency or rebellion. We need to define what is 
actually  happening when a country experiences  civil war. 
 
A defining   aspect is that the stakes are  higher in a genuine civil war. Fragment (Latin 
fragmentum) means ‘broken piece’. The verb ‘to fragment’ (Latin frangere) means ‘to fall to 
pieces’, or simply ‘to break’. Thus   fragmentation  suggests either    a fragment that is the end 
result of the process, or the actual process of breaking into pieces. Neither was  on the cards  
in  Egypt as   a consequence of the Arab Spring, a set of protests which  removed a despot 
(Mubarek), but did not change the regime.  In contrast, the Syrian state can now survive only 
as a fragment of the former entity: the Assad regime fighting from a    fortified enclave and 
remaining the biggest militia in a land of many militias. In the second meaning of the term 
(‘breaking into pieces’),  in    the summer of 2013 fears emerged that the process of breaking 
into many pieces was intensifying, exemplified by the emergence of splits within the Syrian  
opposition. The first killing of a major Free Syrian Army figure by a jihadist group took place in 
July 2013 in Latakia province. As splinters emerged within the Free Syrian Army, between 
Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda, and then with the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq  and 
the Levant and of Ahrar al-Sham, the fear arose that the process of breaking into pieces would 
continue well after the defeat of Assad. This fear of further fragmentation eventually 
influenced  those contemplating military intervention.  
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 The initially broad-based  democratic struggle against Assad has long  given way to many 
different wars taking place simultaneously. One possible outcome,  which also results from 
the   fragmentation of  modern cities (Navez-Bouchanine 2002: 19–44, 45–103),  is chaos. 
Urban chaos results  from the detachment of  different parts of the city, and the     
establishment of internal boundaries that break with the city, as planned   and   perceived as 
a unified entity (ibid: 57). In Syria, the  local administration now rests in the hands of  
paramilitary groups, and enclaves have been established by the Assad regime, the main Sunni 
opposition, the Kurds, and Islamist groups like ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra. What one could 
describe as  a state of    chaos is this  situation of effective   'multiple sovereignties’: enclaves 
in which groups have emerged as 'quasi state actors', or regions that are governed by separate 
de facto governments, with the potential to eventually form rival states.    
 
Kalyvas (2006: 17) argues that civil wars have three objective characteristics: (1) at the outset 
the rivals are subject to a common authority, (2) there is a high level of military organisation 
on both sides, and (3) there is a de facto territorial division between the two sides. These 
criteria are consistent with classical definitions (by Plato, Grotius, and Rousseau), which 
focused on the situation of divided sovereignty (which made a civil war necessary to restore 
order). This  conception is expressed by Caesar’s immediate   reaction to the possibility that 
the rumours of Pompey’s death in Egypt were not true: ‘uselessly we have embroiled the 
nations in civil warfare, if in this world there is any other power than Caesar, if any land 
belongs to two’ (Lucan, trans. Braund 1992 206). Kalyvas (2006: 17) equates a  civil war 
situation with a polity beset specifically by territorial divisions; physical divisions which are 
insupportable to those, like Caesar, wanting to exercise authority.Yet these three  criteria 
could cover many succession crises, palace coups, rebellions and insurgencies, that do not see 
this divisive logic work itself out to its ultimate conclusion. A  de facto territorial division may 
be sustainable for long periods of time, and a  palace coup may have few implications for the 
general population. The split polity thus helps   define a civil war or revolutionary situation, 
but not an actual civil war. 
 
 To identify what is distinctive about civil war, a fourth criterion would be that in order for an 
internal military conflict to be a civil war, attitudes to political authority must become affected 
by the prospect of fragmentation. Fragmentation may be understood in the objective sense: 
‘the Syrian state is really disintegrating’. Yet the  subjective  fact that people anticipated the 
collapse of the Assad regime – and through their response furthered the process of 
fragmentation – is important too. The apprehension of disintegration, and not only in Syria, 
is so important that this subjective factor should be incorporated into the definition of what  
a civil war is. When people begin to apprehend the   consequences of fragmentation and act 
accordingly, they lose that sense of shared fate which underpins any community. Hence these  
conflicts become potentially catastrophic. This  fourth criterion is  consistent with  political 
scientist Roy Licklider's (1995) point that, in order for a conflict to be considered a civil war, 
the contending sides must, at least at the outset, face the prospect of having to live together 
in the future. At some stage during the process of state collapse in Yugoslavia, the conflict 
reached ‘a tipping point’ when the force for drastic change became unstoppable, and people 
gave up on the possibility of living together in the future. At that precise point people’s 
anticipation of what was going to happen became a source of fragmentation in its own right 
 
That sense of  shared fate can  be understood psychologically. The self as an object can   be 
divided into  the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self: each   can be still further 
divided (James 2007: 291–402).  The American psychologist William James (1890) elevated   
the personal self to a high position. Perhaps   the personal self that is lost in civil war is a 
shared idea of the state or the  willingness to co-exist in the future. In psychology the loss of 
self is also often seen as a product of fragmentation: in the worst cases of psychotic 
disassociation, people can have more than one personal self, or the distinctiveness of these 
three selves may be lost. This      is what is happening in Syria; the spatial, ideological and 
sociological foundations of what was Syria are disintegrating.   Licklider’s fourth criterion is 
also compatible   with the nationalism scholar  Steven Grosby’s stress on people’s capacity to 
foresee the future differently as a source of human divisiveness, since rival visions of the 
future will emerge with these fears of fragmentation (Grosby 2005: 107). This fourth criterion 
is also       an example of ‘a structure of’ feeling (Williams 1977), a concept which highlights 
the less tangible characteristics or ‘feeling’ of an era or point in time, the social experience 
that is ‘in solution’ and that has not yet crystallised into institutions or any explicit manifesto 
for the future. What makes a civil war situation a civil war is the addition of such a structure 
of feeling to an objective de facto territorial division; this then leads to the escalation of 
conflict to civil war proportions.  
A criticism could be that this fourth criterion is subjective. One could invoke Thucydides: 
scholars have noticed the parallels between his treatment of the effects of the plague in 
Athens, and those of stasis in Corcyra. No one doubts that the visible signs he reports were 
evidence of these changes. Both are analysed as objective states into which people have 
fallen. Since studying the symptoms of illness is scientific, one could argue that the same 
method should be applied to contemporary conflicts. However, as the contemporary 
historian John Lukacs (2012: 11–13) has suggested,  the dichotomy between objective and 
subjective reality assumed by this criticism is no longer applicable, even in natural sciences 
like physics. The way this ‘structure of feeling’ converts an objective situation into a real civil 
war – as an apprehension of reality, rather than a reaction to it – is an example of the human 
mind intruding into, and complicating the structure of events – as it inevitably does (Lukacs 
2012: 13). If we are forced to hang on to the core assumptions of mechanical explanations of 
social events – causes must precede the effects, and objective situations must be anterior to 
subjective response – then we will not have grasped how the conviction that ‘Syria will be the 
next Somalia’ becomes an enormously important social fact too. 
The question of scientific method takes us back to an issue posed in the introduction to this 
book: whether Thucydides’ focus on the moral distemper occasioned by stasis was scientific? 
Social science has probably gone as far as it can go within disciplinary boundaries in trying to 
define civil war. The arts and the humanities have better insights into the experience they 
generally bring. Were we to extract images and metaphors of experiences of civil war from 
the literature of the past, the idea of fragmentation would still be prominent. Sovereignty to 
Hobbes was the ‘soul’ of the Commonwealth (1985: 272). He   likened the process which led 
people to seek sources of protection other than from the state to the soul’s departure from 
the body. This ‘soul’ can be the state, the idea of the state, the political community, the 
nation, or simply the willingness to live together. For William James the psychologist the 
analogy to the soul was the personal self.   Once it goes, the body (and by implication the 
state), is rendered lifeless or irreparably fragmented.  More recently, the  analysis   of the 
Bolshevik revolution put forward  by the Russian historian Pitirim Soronkin  in  his Sociology 
of Revolution (1928, 1967),  shows how the marks of such wars are inflicted on the bodies of 
a changing society.  His work stressed above all the biological and demographic damage to 
the tissue of Russian society: specific examples being the physical degradation of    the 
population, widespread disease, mental disturbances, falling birth rates, rising mortality rates 
and famine (Sztompka 2014: 450).  The painting by Salvador  DalÍ, Soft Construction with 
Boiled Beans: Premonitions of Civil War,   also uses a  bodily image to show how Spain in the 
1930s  was destroyed not by one thing, but by many afflictions at once. This is  often what 
happens to the human body during a   terminal illness, and   takes us back to Thucydides’ 
depiction of the plague in Athens during the Peloppenesian wars. Dalí, in his intuition that the 
distinctive experience of civil war should be understood not by comparison to other forms of 
war, but with reference to the mortal nature of political systems, was certainly not alone. 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusions to each chapter in this book discussed three issues. The first was the 
continuing importance of the state to civil war studies. Were the state (and state    formation) 
not central to the explanation of why the post-1945 context has been so explosive, political  
science might become redundant in this field.  Causes  always  have  contexts, and  to   know 
the    former we  must understand the latter (Gaddis 2002: 97).    Of the    many  reasons why  
the world that emerged     after World War II made for such an explosive   situation, the 
formation of so many  new  states was the  critical factor. The importance of the state is 
stressed in this conclusion because the understanding of    civil war in some of the most 
prominent contemporary approaches has not sufficiently taken the importance of the state 
and political explanations into account. The economists’ emphasis on civil war as 
‘development in reverse’  means that factors such as decision-making, state power and 
legitimacy – which were traditionally held to explain the rise and fall of states during conflicts 
– do not feature much in their theories.  Perspectives on civil conflict linked to a humanitarian 
agenda, such as the definition of some civil wars as ‘complex emergencies’,  similarly rule out 
the primacy of politics.   And finally, the stress on environmental factors   (such as rough 
terrain) in ‘large-N’ causal explanations of why these conflicts occur, is another reason why 
political scientists (and explanations which stress the primacy of politics) have been  left in a 
state of  relative underemployment in recent years.  
 
This was  not how things began. Thucydides is lauded for being the first political scientist. In 
his history of the Peloponnesian wars, the category of politics included two factors: the 
internal political competition within a state or nation, and the relations between states in 
times of peace and war. Underlying conditions (environmental or sociological) do frame and 
influence the political choices people make in these realms, but they do not make these 
political factors any less decisive (Kagan 2009: 229–30). And no  amount of globalisation  has 
made the political  issue of who  can speak with the authority of the state less important.  
Angola for example   is one of the poorest countries in the world and the way its rich deposits 
of natural resouces attract outside interests,   complicates  its state-building efforts. Not 
surprisingly, the      Angolan   civil war has   been recruited into a story of greed versus 
grievance; of weak and shadow states;  of ethnic conflict, and of outside intervention.  Yet  
both  sides in    its  civil wars relied on  the idea of  the state in order to mobilise people: each  
claimed legitimacy  as the successor to the independence movement, as the symbol of anti-
colonial  resistance, and as provider for and defender  of the Angolan people (Pearce   2012).  
Interviews  done   by the political scientist      Justin Pearce (2012)  on the way in which both   
UNITA and  the MPLA projected an image    as  ‘states in wartime’,  showed that  non-
combatants also appraised the claims of the two sides in terms of these categories. Diamonds 
or not, there was a  struggle over who could speak with the authority of the state. 
 
The second issue discussed in the conclusion to each chapter of this book is the  indiscriminate  
way in which the concept of civil war  is  used in much of  the recent literature. Koselleck 
showed  that after the   European Enlightenment, the concept of crisis was increasingly used 
to diagnose a relatively  permanent world situation. Today   a  semantically bleached    
conception of     civil war is now being      used  to make the same diagnosis with respect to 
much of the developing world.   In ancient Greek, to diagnose a situation as one of crisis 
suggested the  existence of two  radical and irreconcilable alternatives, one of which the 
actors had to  immediately choose (Koselleck 2002: 237). Crucially, each alternative was said 
to involve the saving or  destruction of the existing order (Richter 1995: 55–56). This 
conception of conflict made the      ability to make hard decisions the supreme virtue of 
politics. A useful definition of civil war should also     highlight the drama of such  moments 
and, given the danger of fragmentation, the implications of such moments for the 
continuance of the existing social order. If not all armed conflicts have  implications for the 
continuance of the existing social order,  they  should not be called civil wars. 
 
 The third issue  we have repeatedly re-visited in this book is the problem of human 
divisiveness The traditional fear of civil war assumed that wars brought out the worst in 
human nature.This is expressed in the naturalist explanation of civil war. The situationalist 
explanation, on the other hand, was that the creation of more than 130 new states since 1918    
provided a tailor-made context for so many civil wars. Yet any attempt at establishing the 
historical foundations of the form of divisiveness represented by civil war will always run into 
the simple question: why have civil  wars have arisen in every regime form known to 
humankind? (Grosby 2005: 103). Perhaps the creation of so many states  provided only an 
opportunity for something in human nature never far below the surface. This epilogue  has 
attempted to find a middle ground between these two perspectives on violent conflict. 
Readers can judge for themselves whether my use of the concept of fragmentation has 
provided such a bridge.  Thucydides blamed stasis both on human nature and on the evolving 
Greek system of city states. Yet he knew that what sets in during civil war is less open to 
contextual explanation. Concepts such as crisis, escalation, polarisation, radicalisation, and 
here  fragmentation,  have been developed precisely for this reason. However well   historical 
and sociological contexts  explain why a conflict situation emerges, we also need  to account 
for how human divisiveness expresses itself in those situations, and especially why one people 
breaks into two (or more). No doubt the situationalists are right: the contexts which make for 
really deep divisions   are exceptional, and can be explained in terms of things going badly 
wrong. Yet their consequences cannot be predicted ex ante. Moreover, civil war results in the 
killing of one’s neighbours, perhaps one’s family, an aspect of human divisiveness that, in 
truth, is not explained by either perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
